The Price of Unpredictability: Scheduling Demands, Gender and Selection in the Gig Economy

Natasha Jha (), Martin Abel () and Patrizio Piraino ()
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Natasha Jha: Centre for Advanced Financial Research and Learning
Martin Abel: Bowdoin College
Patrizio Piraino: University of Notre Dame

No 18976, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: We study how scheduling demands shape gig-work supply and its composition in an experiment with U.S. gig workers, eliciting reservation wages for contracts varying in advance notice, timing, and duration. No-notice contracts raise reservation wages by 13–14 percent, while outside-hours work with notice carries little penalty. Women require 5–6 percent more than men for outside-hours or no-notice work, and 8–9 percent more when combined. These gaps are largest among workers with heavy household-chore burdens and inflexible schedules. Higher-productivity workers also require larger no-notice premiums. At a given wage, demanding contracts therefore reduce labor supply and select a lower-productivity labor pool.

Keywords: scheduling demands; gig economy; gender gap; reservation wages; worker selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 J16 J22 J31 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-lma
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