A Theory of Immigration Amnesties

Gil Epstein and Avi Weiss

No 302, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: This paper presents a first attempt at understanding some of the many issues involved in the granting of an amnesty to illegal immigrants. We consider government behavior with respect to allocations on limiting infiltration (border control) and apprehending infiltrators (internal control) and with respect to the granting of amnesties, the timing of amnesties, and limitations on eligibility for those amnesties. We demonstrate the effects of government actions on allocations and the flow of immigrants, and how the interactions between these factors combine to yield an optimal amnesty policy. We also consider various extensions such as intertemporal transfers of policing funds, risk-aversion, and "fuzziness" in declarations regarding eligibility for an amnesty aimed at apprehending and deporting undesirables.

Keywords: internal controls; Amnesty; immigration; illegal immigration; border controls (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H59 J61 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2001-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Published - published as "The Why, When and How of Immigration Amnesties" in: Journal of Population Economics, 2011, 24 (1), 285-316

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https://docs.iza.org/dp302.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A Theory of Immigration Amnesties (2001)
Working Paper: A Theory of Immigration Amnesties (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp302

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