Is Being 'Soft on Crime' the Solution to Rising Crime Rates? Evidence from Germany

Horst Entorf and Hannes Spengler ()

No 3710, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: Based on a theoretical framework on informal, custodial and non-custodial sentencing, the paper provides econometric tests on the effectiveness of police, public prosecution and courts. Using a unique dataset covering German states for the period 1977–2001, a comprehensive system of criminal prosecution indicators is derived and subsequently related to the incidence of six major offence categories using panel-econometrics. Empirical evidence suggests that the criminal policy of diversion failed as increasing shares of dismissals by prosecutors and judges enhance crime rates in Germany. Crime is significantly deterred by higher clearance and conviction rates, while the effects of indicators representing type (fine, probation, imprisonment) and severity (length of prison sentence, size of fine) of punishment are often small and insignificant.

Keywords: evaluation of policy reforms; econometrics of crime; panel econometrics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp3710.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Is Being 'Soft on Crime' the Solution to Rising Crime Rates?: Evidence from Germany (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3710

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark Fallak ().