Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes

Paola Manzini and Clara Ponsati

No 395, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a bilateral agreement. We explore the strategic implications of this third party involvement. Our main finding is that the potential willingness of the stakeholder to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he enters bargaining directly. Our results lend support to the tendency towards decentralisation of pay bargaining in the public sector in Europe.

Keywords: stakeholders; public sector; Bargaining; labour relations; strikes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2001-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - revised version published as 'Stakeholder Bargaining Games' in: International Journal of Game Theory, 2006, 34 (1), 67-77

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Related works:
Working Paper: Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes (2010)
Working Paper: Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes (2001)
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