Employment Protection and Product Market Regulation

Winfried Koeniger and Andrea Vindigni

No 880, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Product market regulation and employment protection are highly correlated across OECD countries. Using an augmented model of monopolistic competition we show why in countries with more regulated product markets, incumbent workers prefer to protect jobs relatively more. Product market regulation increases the scope for employment protection because firms can bear the cost of employment protection more easily and still break even. Moreover, product market regulation decreases employment so that the workers' outside option becomes relatively worse. This increases the incentive to protect the job.

Keywords: collective dismissal cost; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J63 J65 L16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2003-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp880.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp880

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().