When One Decides for Many: the Effect of Delegation Methods on Cooperation in Simulated Inter-Group Conflicts

Ramzi Suleiman () and Ilan Fischer ()

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2000, vol. 3, issue 4, 1

Abstract: The study explores the evolution of decision strategies and the emergence of cooperation in simulated societies. In the context of an inter-group conflict, we simulate three different institutions for the aggregation of attitudes. We assume that: (a) the conflict can be modeled as an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma played by two decision makers, each representing her group for a fixed duration; (b) the performance of each group's representative influences her group members and, consequently, her prospects to be reelected. Our main objectives are: (1) to investigate the effects of three power-delegation mechanisms: Random Representation, Mean Representation, and Minimal Winning Coalition representation, on the emergence of representatives' decision strategies, (2) to investigate the effect of the frequency of elections on the evolving inter-group relations. Outcomes of 1080 simulations show that the emergence of cooperation is strongly influenced by the delegation mechanism, the election frequency, and the interaction between these two factors.

Keywords: Prisoner's Dilemma; Intergroup Conflict; Evolution of Cooperation; Social Influence; Representation; Elections Frequency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-10-31
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jas:jasssj:2000-5-1

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