Cooperation with Random Interactions and Without Memory or "tags"

Hugo Fort ()
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Hugo Fort: http://www.fisica.edu.uy/~hugo

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2003, vol. 6, issue 2, 4

Abstract: The self-organization into cooperative regimes of a system of "selfish" agents playing the pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG) is analyzed using a simple agent-based model. At each time step t, the agents divide into those who cooperate (C) and those who defect (D). The agents have no memory and use strategies not based on direct reciprocity nor 'tags'. Only one dynamical variable is assigned to each agent, namely his income at time t dC(t) obtained by playing the PDG with a partner chosen at random. A simple adapting strategy for the behavior of the agents (C or D) is shown to give rise, for a wide variety of PD payoff matrices, to a cooperative regime resistant to ?always D? strategy.

Keywords: Cooperation; complex adaptive agents; prisoner?s dilemma; game theory; evolutionary model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-03-31
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jas:jasssj:2002-43-2

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