Evolution of Cooperation when Feedback to Reputation Scores is Voluntary

Marco A. Janssen ()
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Marco A. Janssen: https://marcojanssen.info/

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2006, vol. 9, issue 1, 17

Abstract: Reputation systems are used to facilitate interaction between strangers in one-shot social dilemmas, like transactions in e-commerce. The functioning of various reputation systems depend on voluntary feedback derived from the participants in those social dilemmas. In this paper a model is presented under which frequencies of providing feedback to positive and negative experiences in reputation systems explain observed levels of cooperation. The results from simulations show that it is not likely that reputation scores alone will lead to high levels of cooperation.

Keywords: Trust; Reputation; One-Shot Prisoner Dilemma; Voluntary Feedback; Symbols (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-01-31
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jas:jasssj:2005-12-3

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