Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game Based on the Second-Best Decision

Tetsushi Ohdaira () and Takao Terano ()
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Tetsushi Ohdaira: http://www016.upp.so-net.ne.jp/porco/
Takao Terano: http://www.trn.dis.titech.ac.jp

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2009, vol. 12, issue 4, 7

Abstract: In the research addressing the prisoner's dilemma game, the effectiveness and accountableness of the method allowing for the emergence of cooperation is generally discussed. The most well-known solutions for this question are memory based iteration, the tag used to distinguish between defector and cooperator, the spatial structure of the game and the either direct or indirect reciprocity. We have also challenged to approach the topic from a different point of view namely that temperate acquisitiveness in decision making could be possible to achieve cooperation. It was already shown in our previous research that the exclusion of the best decision had a remarkable effect on the emergence of an almost cooperative state. In this paper, we advance the decision of our former research to become more explainable by introducing the second-best decision. If that decision is adopted, players also reach an extremely high level cooperative state in the prisoner's dilemma game and also in that of extended strategy expression. The cooperation of this extended game is facilitated only if the product of two parameters is under the criticality. In addition, the applicability of our model to the problem in the real world is discussed.

Keywords: Cooperation; Altruism; Agent-Based Simulation; Evolutionary Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-10-31
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