The Evolutionary Dominance of Ethnocentric Cooperation

Max Hartshorn (), Artem Kaznatcheev () and Thomas Shultz ()
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Artem Kaznatcheev: http://www.cs.mcgill.ca/~akazna/
Thomas Shultz: http://www.tomshultz.net/

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2013, vol. 16, issue 3, 7

Abstract: Recent agent-based computer simulations suggest that ethnocentrism, often thought to rely on complex social cognition and learning, may have arisen through biological evolution. From a random start, ethnocentric strategies dominate other possible strategies (selfish, traitorous, and humanitarian) based on cooperation or non-cooperation with in-group and out-group agents. Here we show that ethnocentrism eventually overcomes its closest competitor, humanitarianism, by exploiting humanitarian cooperation across group boundaries as world population saturates. Selfish and traitorous strategies are self-limiting because such agents do not cooperate with agents sharing the same genes. Traitorous strategies fare even worse than selfish ones because traitors are exploited by ethnocentrics across group boundaries in the same manner as humanitarians are, via unreciprocated cooperation. By tracking evolution across time, we find individual differences between evolving worlds in terms of early humanitarian competition with ethnocentrism, including early stages of humanitarian dominance. Our evidence indicates that such variation, in terms of differences between humanitarian and ethnocentric agents, is normally distributed and due to early, rather than later, stochastic differences in immigrant strategies.

Keywords: Ethnocentrism; Evolution of Cooperation; Evolutionary Game Theory; Minimal Cognition; Prisoner's Dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-06-30
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