The Explanation of Social Conventions by Melioration Learning

Johannes Zschache ()
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Johannes Zschache: http://sozweb.sozphil.uni-leipzig.de/en/personen/ma-johannes-zschache.html

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2017, vol. 20, issue 3, 1

Abstract: In line with previous research, the evolution of social conventions is explored by n-way coordination games. A convention is said to be established if decisions of all actors synchronise over time. In contrast to the earlier studies, an empirically well-grounded process of reinforcement learning is used as behavioural assumption. The model is called melioration learning. It is shown by agent-based simulations that melioration enables actors to establish a convention. Besides the payoffs of the coordination game, the network structure of interactions affects actors' ability to coordinate their choices and the speed of convergence. The results of melioration learning are compared to predictions of the Roth-Erev model.

Keywords: Reinforcement Learning; Agent-Based Simulation; N-Way Coordination Game; Roth-Erev Model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-06-30
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