Explaining the “Harmonic†Signature in a Tag-Based Model of the Evolution of Altruism

Shade T. Shutters ()
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Shade T. Shutters: https://search.asu.edu/profile/340746

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2026, vol. 29, issue 4, 11

Abstract: This paper offers an explanation for the anomalous and unexplained behavior of an agent-based model previously described in JASSS in 2015. In their model of tag-based altruism, Shutters and Hales described a curious and unexpected “harmonic†or quantized signature observed in the model's output. This manuscript synthesizes two lines of analysis in an attempt to explain these results. First, it provides a conceptual explanation for the presence of sharp thresholds in the evolved donation rate when the number of interactions per generation $P$ crosses integer multiples of the benefit–cost ratio $b/c$. Second, it presents a minimal analytic toy model that reproduces quantized cooperation levels with thresholds at $P approx n(b/c)$. Throughout, this study interprets these results in the broader context of graph-structured cooperation and tag-based altruism in evolutionary game theory

Keywords: Altruism; Cooperation; Agent-Based Model; Network Dynamics; Tag-Based Strategy; Evolutionary Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10-31
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jas:jasssj:2025-206-2

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