Welfare, Corruption, and the Economic Vote of Punishment: The Turkish Case

Yasushi Hazama

No 908, IDE Discussion Papers from Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO)

Abstract: Do social security and corruption control buffer electoral punishment for poor economic conditions? Previous studies have shown that both generous social security and corruption control mitigate the impact of economic conditions on incumbent votes. However, whether these two noneconomic issues lessen punishment or reward behaviours or both is unclear. Using a dataset from a 2018 post-election survey in Turkey, this study shows that social security weakens reward behaviour but not punishment behaviour, whereas corruption control weakens punishment behaviour but not reward behaviour. When economic grievances dominate public opinion, corruption control is more critical for incumbent support than social security provision.

Keywords: Economic; voting|Social; security|Corruption|Grievance; asymmetry|Turkey (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in IDE Discussion Paper = IDE Discussion Paper, No.908. 2023-11

Downloads: (external link)
https://ir.ide.go.jp/record/2000107/files/IDP000908_001.pdf First version, 2023 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jet:dpaper:dpaper908

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Publication Office, IDE 3-2-2 Wakaba, Mihama-ku, Chiba-shi, Chiba 261-8545 JAPAN
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Order

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IDE Discussion Papers from Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michitaka Imamitsu ().