School choice under complete information: An experimental study

Yan Chen, Yingzhi Liang () and Tayfun Sönmez
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Yingzhi Liang: University of Michigan, USA

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2016, vol. 1, issue 1, 45-82

Abstract: We present an experimental study of three school choice mechanisms under complete information, using the designed environment in Chen & Sönmez (2006). We find that the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism outperforms both the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance (DA) and the Boston immediate acceptance (BOS) mechanism in terms of truth-telling and efficiency, whereas DA is more stable than either TTC or BOS. Compared to the incomplete information setting in Chen & Sönmez (2006), the performance of both TTC and BOS improves with more information, whereas that of DA does not.

Keywords: School choice; experiment; mechanism design. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C92 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v1i1a2

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2016.12.002

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