Mechanisms for House Allocation with Existing Tenants under Dichotomous Preferences

Haris Aziz ()
Additional contact information
Haris Aziz: Data61, CSIRO and UNSW Sydney, Australia

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2018, vol. 3, issue 1, 97-110

Abstract: We consider house allocation with existing tenants in which each agent has dichotomous preferences. We present strategyproof, polynomial-time, and (strongly) individually rational algorithms that satisfy the maximum number of agents. For the endowment only model, one of the algorithms also returns a core-stable allocation.

Keywords: House allocation; core; dichotomous preferences. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C63 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v003-1/p_04.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v3i1a4

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2018.12.004

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design from Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paul Schweinzer ().