Rights and rents in local commons

Sjur Didrik Flåm ()
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Sjur Didrik Flåm: University of Bergen, Norway

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2020, vol. 5, issue 1, 119-140

Abstract: Motivated by management problems in national fisheries, we examine management of renewable resources in local or regional commons. This paper suggests that property rights, or lack thereof, be replaced by well-defined user rights. It shows that the use of commons can be conditioned, paid for, or valued, via market mechanisms. To that end, direct deals and double auctions are expedient. Either institution can distribute, restore and secure resource rent. Either can also focalize debates as to which assignments, regulations or taxation of rights might be fair or legitimate.

Keywords: Rights; rent; commons. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D33 D51 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v5i1a5

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2020.12.005

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