Characterization of incentive compatible single-parameter mechanisms revisited

Krzysztof R. Apt () and Jan Heering ()
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Krzysztof R. Apt: University of Warsaw
Jan Heering: CWI Amsterdam

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2022, vol. 7, issue 1, 113-129

Abstract: We reexamine the characterization of incentive compatible single-parameter mechanisms introduced in Archer and Tardos (2001). We argue that the claimed uniqueness result, called 'Myerson's Lemma' was not well established. We provide an elementary proof of uniqueness that unifies the presentation for two classes of allocation functions used in the literature and show that the general case is a consequence of a little known result from the theory of real functions. We also clarify that our proof of uniqueness is more elementary than the previous one. Finally, by generalizing our characterization result to more dimensions, we provide alternative proofs of revenue equivalence results for multiunit auctions and combinatorial auctions.

Keywords: Incentive compatibility; single-parameter mechanisms; Myerson's lemma; auctions; revenue equivalence. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v7i1a4

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2022.12.004

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