Object-based unawareness: Theory and applications

Zhan Wang (), Jinpeng Ma () and Hongwei Zhang ()
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Zhan Wang: Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China
Jinpeng Ma: Rutgers University-Camden, USA
Hongwei Zhang: Sichuan University, China

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2023, vol. 8, issue 1, 1-55

Abstract: Affordable housing lotteries often enforce a rule preventing duplicate lottery entries that makes the model in Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) (HZ) inapplicable. We revisit HZ and propose a new individually stable (IS) allocation that can be achieved by a Tickets algorithm and accommodate the rule. A strictly envy-free (SEF) allocation is shown to be the unique IS and Pareto-optimal allocation, the outcome of the unique strong Nash equilibrium of a congestion game, and the unique Pseudo market equilibrium allocation in HZ. The algorithm always obtains the unique SEF allocation (if any) and fixes a designed flaw of existing lotteries.

Keywords: Affordable housing; lottery allocations; Tickets algorithm. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D63 H42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v8i1a1

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2023.12.001

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