Golden rule in cooperative commons

Sjur Didrik Flam ()
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Sjur Didrik Flam: University of Bergen, Norway

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2023, vol. 8, issue 1, 57-74

Abstract: This paper considers common use of natural, renewable resources. It identifies good prospects for efficiency and welfare. To be precise, a core outcome -- hence cooperation -- can be secured over time by principal planning of total quotas, and in time by agents who share these in short-term markets. Information flows in two directions: to the principal as market prices and from him as total quantities. Of particular interest is eventual convergence to a golden-rule, steady state.

Keywords: Renewable resources; commons; golden rule. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D23 D44 P13 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v8i1a2

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2023.12.002

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