Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players

Pathikrit Basu ()

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2023, vol. 8, issue 1, 97-106

Abstract: We consider a setting in which a mechanism designer must choose the appropriate social alternative depending on the state of nature. We study the problem of optimal design and demonstrate that a mechanism which allocates resources so as to achieve the social optimum and assigns payments equal to the posterior expected utility of the agent at the social optimum, is an epsilon-optimal mechanism for environments with many players.

Keywords: Mechanism design; incentive compatibility; statistical decision theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D61 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v8i1a4

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2023.12.004

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