An Efficient and General Ascending Menu Auction under Budget Constraints

Zaifu Yang () and Jingsheng Yu ()
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Zaifu Yang: University of York, United Kingdom
Jingsheng Yu: Wuhan University, China

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2024, vol. 9, issue 1, 105-130

Abstract: An auctioneer wishes to sell multiple heterogeneous indivisible items to several bidders. Every bidder can demand several items, have complex preferences and faces a hard budget constraint. In this setting, Walrasian equilibria may fail to exist. We propose an ascending menu auction that always yields an efficient allocation of items, which is not only in the core but also strongly Pareto efficient. Furthermore, the auction finds a strong core allocation with a fully efficient assignment of items when bidders are not budget constrained.

Keywords: Dynamic menu auction; core; budget constraints. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v9i1a6

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2024.12.006

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