A note on the effect of elections subject to judicial review

J. J. Arias

Atlantic Economic Journal, 2003, vol. 31, issue 4, 376-383

Abstract: The most recent U.S. presidential election raised the questions of whether or not agents who believe that losing candidates will contest the results of close elections perceive their vote as more important and whether or not they will be more or less likely to vote. The analysis involves a two-player voting game with one of the players initially in a weaker position because he loses all ties. The key variable is the probability of the weaker player winning the post-election judicial review process. The relationship between this probability and the level of voting for the weaker player is non-monotonic. Also, if this probability is sufficiently close to one-half, contesting close elections leads to increased voting, lowering social welfare. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2003

Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02298495

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