Harvesting versus Biodiversity: An Occam's Razor Version
Chuan-Zhong Li (),
Karl-Gustaf Löfgren and
Martin Weitzman
Environmental & Resource Economics, 2001, vol. 18, issue 4, 355-366
Abstract:
The point of departure for this paper is the familiar prototype fisheriesmodel where a fictitious sole owner harvests a fish population to maximizepresent discounted profits. The paper answers analytically the followingquestion. ``What happens to a policy when the sole owner also valuesbiodiversity, as well as profits?'' It turns out that the size of the steady-state stock and the number of species preserved are both higher, whenspecies diversity is positively valued. This paper provides a sharpcharacterization of the optimal policy in terms of the usual economicparameters and an exogenously introduced willingness-to-pay function forspecies preservation. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001
Keywords: biodiversity; optimal policy; parameters (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:enreec:v:18:y:2001:i:4:p:355-366
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1011184509459
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