Equity vs. efficiency vs. self-interest: on the use of dictator games to measure distributional preferences

Pamela Jakiela

Experimental Economics, 2013, vol. 16, issue 2, 208-221

Abstract: We conduct modified dictator games in which price of giving varies across choice situations, and examine responses to price changes in two contexts—one where dictators divide their own earnings, and another where they divide the earnings of others. Varying the price of giving allows us to decompose social preferences into two components: the level of altruism when the price of giving is one, and the willingness to reduce aggregate payoffs to enhance equity. Changing the source of a dictator’s budget impacts her decisions because it affects the weight that she places on others’ payoffs. However, we find no impacts on the willingness to trade off equity and efficiency. Copyright Economic Science Association 2013

Keywords: Social preferences; Equity-efficiency tradeoffs; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-012-9332-x

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