Trust and reciprocity: extensions and robustness of triadic design

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and Stefano Papa

Experimental Economics, 2016, vol. 19, issue 1, 100-115

Abstract: Our paper reconsiders the triadic design proposed by Cox (Games and Economic Behavior 46:260–281, 2004 ) to identify trust and reciprocity in investment games. Specifically, we extend the design in two directions. First, we collect information on investors’ choices by using both the direct-response (as does Cox) and strategy methods. Using the latter, we are able to condition reciprocity on initial inequality, which is endogenous when investigating reciprocity. We demonstrate that the triadic design provides evidence for reciprocity once that initial inequality is considered. Second, we elicit expectations and test their coherence with the triadic outcomes. By examining the relationship between trust actions and expected gains, we analyze whether investors’ expectations are consistent with their behavior. Finally, we test for the existence of an emotional bias, i.e., whether expectation mismatches induce trustees to change actual choices from the planned ones. Copyright Economic Science Association 2016

Keywords: Other-regarding preferences; Investment game; Expectation; Inequality; Strategy method (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Trust and reciprocity: extensions and robustness of triadic design (2016)
Working Paper: Trust and reciprocity: Extensions and robustness of triadic design (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:19:y:2016:i:1:p:100-115

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-014-9428-6

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