Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts

Luís Aguiar-Conraria (), Pedro C. Magalhães and Christoph A. Vanberg
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Pedro C. Magalhães: University of Lisbon
Christoph A. Vanberg: University of Heidelberg

Experimental Economics, 2016, vol. 19, issue 4, No 10, 886-909

Abstract: Abstract Many democratic decision making institutions involve quorum rules. Such rules are commonly motivated by concerns about the “legitimacy” or “representativeness” of decisions reached when only a subset of eligible voters participates. A prominent example of this can be found in the context of direct democracy mechanisms, such as referenda and initiatives. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the consequences of the two most common types of quorum rules: a participation quorum and an approval quorum. We find that both types of quora lead to lower participation rates, dramatically increasing the likelihood of full-fledged electoral boycotts on the part of those who endorse the Status Quo. This discouraging effect is significantly larger under a participation quorum than under an approval quorum.

Keywords: Election design; Participation quorum; Approval quorum; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D02 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts (2013)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9473-9

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