Categorization of Whistleblowers Using the Whistleblowing Triangle

Nadia Smaili () and Paulina Arroyo ()
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Nadia Smaili: Université du Québec à Montréal
Paulina Arroyo: Université du Québec à Montréal

Journal of Business Ethics, 2019, vol. 157, issue 1, No 7, 95-117

Abstract: Abstract In view of recent studies that identified certain interest groups as potential whistleblowers, we propose an integrative conceptual framework to examine whistleblower behavior by whistleblower type. The framework, dubbed the whistleblowing triangle, is modeled on the fraud triangle and is comprised of three factors that condition the act of whistleblowing: pressure, opportunity, and rationalization. For a rich examination, we use a qualitative research framework to analyze 11 whistleblowing cases of corporate financial statement fraud in Canada that were publicly denounced between 1995 and 2012. Our analysis indicates that whistleblowers are not only insiders (employees, managers, and shareholders involved in management) but also outsiders [financial analysts (short sellers), auditing firms, journalists, politicians, customers, and investors]. It also suggests that a dynamic relation may exist between whistleblowers. In addition, our findings show that most whistleblowers opt for external channels when they fail to receive an adequate response from management, seek media exposure, are interested in financial benefits resulting from the act of whistleblowing (short sellers), or are interested in protecting their investment. Lastly, we propose categorizing whistleblowers into four conceptual types: protective, skeptical, role-prescribed, and self-interested.

Keywords: Whistleblower type; Whistleblowing channel; Financial statement fraud (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10551-017-3663-7

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