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From Fiduciary Duty to Impact Fidelity: Managerial Compensation in Impact Investing

Isaline Thirion (), Patrick Reichert, Virginie Xhauflair () and Jonathan Jonck ()
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Isaline Thirion: Université de Liège
Virginie Xhauflair: Université de Liège
Jonathan Jonck: Telos Impact & Solvay

Journal of Business Ethics, 2022, vol. 179, issue 4, No 4, 1010 pages

Abstract: Abstract Investors with standard monetary preferences will give a fund manager incentives to increase firm profits, which can be achieved through a share in profits via carried interest. When investors have social preferences, it is not clear which incentives the manager should receive. We explore this puzzle by applying an agency theory perspective to impact investing, a practice where investors seek both financial returns and a measurable social or environmental impact. Using an inductive, qualitative approach, we identify and describe the ethical tensions and challenges faced by fund managers to structure and implement impact-based variable compensation schemes. Our results indicate that economic incentives tied to non-financial objectives are useful to alleviate goal incongruity between principals and agents during fund creation but have the potential to lead to perverse effects during the fund lifecycle, where managers may exploit subjective non-financial metrics to maximize personal wealth. We introduce the concept of impact fidelity, a conceptual equivalent of fiduciary duty, to ensure that investment decisions reflect the asset owner’s impact preferences.

Keywords: Impact investing; Agency theory; Executive compensation; Incentive contracts; Venture capital; Impact fidelity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10551-022-05155-5

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