E Pluribus Unum? Authorities' Design in Financial Supervision: Trends and Determinants

Donato Masciandaro ()

Open Economies Review, 2006, vol. 17, issue 1, 73-102

Abstract: This paper presents an analysis of recent trends and determinants in the architectures of financial supervision, focused on the authorities design. We propose a path dependence approach to study the single authority versus multi-authority dilemma, considering the level of financial supervision consolidation as the dependent variable. In particular, in a movement towards full consolidation in supervision, one can think of two sharp alternatives: a monopolist central bank or a pure single financial authority. Given that the degree of supervision consolidation seems to be inversely correlated with central bank involvement in supervision itself, the paper sheds light on the possible explanation of this trade-off. The trade off is tested using Probit techniques with a sample of 68 countries. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Keywords: financial supervision; single authority; central bank (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11079-006-4739-7

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