Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation

Martin Bodenstein and Heinrich Ursprung

Public Choice, 2005, vol. 124, issue 3, 329-352

Abstract: This paper investigates the behavior of rent-seeking politicians in an environment of increasing economic integration. The focus of the paper is on the implications of globalization-induced political yardstick competition for constitutional design with a view to the current discussion in the European Union. In contrast to the established literature, we carefully portray the double-tiered government structure in federal systems. The number of lower-tier governments and the allocation of policy responsibilities to the two levels of government are subject to constitutional choice. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Political Yardstick Competition, Economic Integration, and Constitutional Choice in a Federation (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:124:y:2005:i:3:p:329-352

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-2051-5

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