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Motivations behind Peer-to-Peer (Counter-)Punishment in Public Goods Games: An Experiment

Kenju Kamei and Katy Tabero
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Katy Tabero: Department of Economics, University of Southampton

No DP2025-019, Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series from Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University

Abstract: It is well-known that efficiency often fails to improve in public goods games with peer-to-peer punishment when counter-punishment is possible. This paper experimentally demonstrates, for the first time, that the effects of sanctioning institutions are modest, regardless of the decision-making format (individual or team). In the “team†conditions, subjects are randomly assigned to teams of three, and make joint decisions through communication. Their dialogue provides valuable insights into the motivations behind (counter-)punishment, as well as the resulting behavioral effects. A coding exercise reveals that first-order punishments (and counter-punishments) are primarily emotional responses to peers’ low contributions (and first order punishments, respectively).

Keywords: experiment; public goods game; punishment; counter-punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D01 H49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2025-08-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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