Regulation on Gene Diagnosis and Non-Existence of Equilibrium in the Lif/Medical Insurance Market

Nobuyuki Soga
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Nobuyuki Soga: Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, Japan

No 113, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University

Abstract: This study is based on the assumption that in future, genetic testing will create a situation where people can tell whether they are disposed to certain diseases including cancer, but utilization of such genetic testing is banned for the purposes of medical examination of insurants. What, then, would the response of people to genetic testing from an economics perspectives?.

Keywords: Genetic Testing; Regulation on Gene Diagnosis; Non-Existence of Equilibrium; Adverse Selection; Insurance Markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 I10 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2000-07
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