Assistance-proofness

Ryoga Doi
Additional contact information
Ryoga Doi: Graduate School of Economics, Keio University and Junior Research Fellow, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, JAPAN

No DP2025-12, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University

Abstract: We consider situations in which the final ranking of candidates is determined by rankings of multiple factors. For example, in Formula 1 racing, the annual ranking is determined by the results of many races. In sport climbing, the final ranking is determined by combining the results of two or three events. Dependent on rules that aggregate rankings across multiple factors, a candidate can improve the final position of a fellow candidate by holding back her performance without dropping the final position. We call the property of rules that prevent this kind of strategic manipulation assistance-proofness. We show that when there are four or more events, no scoring rule other than the null rule satisfies assistance-proofness. However, when there are two events, all dichotomous scoring rules satisfy assistance-proofness. For three events, we characterize a subclass of dichotomous scoring rules that satisfy assistanceproofness.

Keywords: Assistance-proofness; Scoring rules; Voting; Strategic manipulation; Collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2025-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-spo
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/DP2025-12.pdf First version, 2024 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2025-12

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University 2-1 Rokkodai, Nada, Kobe 657-8501 JAPAN. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Office of Promoting Research Collaboration, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University ().