Incentives to Vaccinate

Pol Campos-Mercade, Armando N. Meier, Stephan Meier, Devin Pope, Florian H. Schneider and Erik Wengstroem
Additional contact information
Pol Campos-Mercade: Department of Economics, Lund University
Armando N. Meier: Department of Economics, University of Basel
Stephan Meier: Columbia Business School, Columbia University
Devin Pope: Booth School of Business, University of Chicago
Florian H. Schneider: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Erik Wengstroem: Department of Economics, Lund University

No 24-15, CEBI working paper series from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. The Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality (CEBI)

Abstract: Whether monetary incentives to change behavior work and how they should be structured are fundamental economic questions. We overcome typical data limitations in a large-scale field experiment on vaccination (N = 5; 324) with a unique combination of administrative and survey data. We find that guaranteed incentives of $20 increase uptake by 13 percentage points in the short run and 9 in the long run. Guaranteed incentives are more e ective than lottery-based, prosocial, or individually-targeted incentives, though all boost vaccinations. There are no unintended consequences on future vaccination or heterogeneities based on vaccination attitudes and incentivized economic preferences. Further, administrative data on relatives shows substantial positive spillovers. Our findings demonstrate the great potential of incentives for improving public health and provide guidance on their design.

Keywords: incentives; health behavior; social preferences; prosociality; risk preferences; vaccination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D01 D62 I12 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 93
Date: 2025-01-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hea and nep-nud
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