 One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles and Research JointventuresRabah Amir () and John Wooders No 1998-10, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics Abstract: We consider a two-period duopoly characterized by a one-way spillover structure in process R&D and a very broad specification of product market competition. We show that a priori identical firms always engage in different levels of R&D, at equilibrium, thus giving rise to an innovator/imitator configuration and ending up with different sizes. In view of this endogenous firm heterogeneity, the social benefits of, and the firms´ incentives for, research joint ventures are somewhat different from the case of ex post firm symmetry. The key properties of the game are submodularity (R&D decisions are strategic substitutes) and lack of global concavity. Keywords: oligopolistic R&D; one-way spillovers; research joint ventures; submodularity (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in: Games and Economic Behaviour, 31(1), 2000, 1-25 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:1998-10 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics �ster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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