Noncooperative R&D and Optimal R&D Cartels

Rabah Amir (), Igor Evstigneev and John Wooders

No 2000-09, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics

Abstract: This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of optimal R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers. Within the context of a standard specification, we provide conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover.

Keywords: oligopolistic R&D; Spillovers; research joint ventures; R&D cartel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2000-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:2000-09

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