Anti-dumping Duties and the Byrd Amendment

David Collie and Hylke Vandenbussche

LICOS Discussion Papers from LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven

Abstract: The Byrd amendment to US anti-dumping law distributes the revenue from anti-dumping duties imposed on foreign firms to the domestic firms that lodged the complaint of dumping. When the government sets its anti-dumping duty to maximise a welfare function that attaches greater weight to the profits of the domestic industry than to consumer surplus or tax revenue, it is shown that the Byrd amendment will lead to lower duties and higher welfare if the weight on the profits of the domestic industry is sufficiently large. Also, the Byrd amendment makes it less likely that the anti-dumping duty will be prohibitive.

Keywords: Tariffs; US trade policy; WTO; Cournot oligopoly. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Anti-Dumping Duties and the Byrd Amendment (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lic:licosd:14904

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