The Need for Better Internal Oversight of Corporate Lobbying

Robert Repetto

Challenge, 2007, vol. 50, issue 1, 76-96

Abstract: The author shows by example that corporate lobbying on public policy issues is not always in the best interests of shareholders—or customers or employees. Best practice by leading companies provides oversight of lobbying by the board of directors, but far too few companies now employ such practices.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.2753/0577-5132500107

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