Why do Judges Grant Rehearing Requests? Evidence from the Supreme Court of Israel

Yehonatan Givati and Israel Rosenberg

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2023, vol. 179, issue 1, 6-22

Abstract: Why do judges grant rehearing requests? We focus on rehearing requests in the Supreme Court of Israel, where the decision to hold a rehearing is made by a single judge and is documented. Using original data on all rehearing decisions since 2006, we find that judges who grant requests for a rehearing, are much more likely than other judges on the same rehearing panel, to reverse the original ruling in the rehearing. This difference is especially large for politically salient cases. This finding is consistent with the idea that judges grant rehearing requests when they disagree with the original ruling, from a policy perspective.

Keywords: judicialbehavior; rehearingrequests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1628/jite-2023-0011

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