Antitrust, Amazon, and Algorithmic Auditing
Abhisek Dash,
Abhijnan Chakraborty,
Saptarshi Ghosh,
Animesh Mukherjee,
Jens Frankenreiter,
Stefan Bechtold and
Krishna P. Gummadi
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2024, vol. 180, issue 2, 319-346
Abstract:
In digital markets, antitrust law and special regulations aim to ensure that markets remain competitive despite the dominating role that digital platforms play today in everyone's life. Unlike traditional markets, market participant behavior is easily observable in these markets. We present a series of empirical investigations into the extent to which Amazon engages in practices that are typically described as self-preferencing. We discuss how the computer science tools used in this paper can be used in a regulatory environment that is based on algorithmic auditing and requires regulating digital markets at scale.
Keywords: antitrust; self-preferencing; Digital Markets Act; regulating at scale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L40 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/antitrust-a ... 101628jite-2024-0014
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:doi:10.1628/jite-2024-0014
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
DOI: 10.1628/jite-2024-0014
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C
More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().