Endogenous Information Disclosure in Contests with Delegation

Pan Sang Kang

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2024, vol. 180, issue 4, 577-596

Abstract: We study a two-player contestwith delegation in which each player has discretion over whether or not to disclose information about her delegation contract to the rival party. By investigating each player's decision on information disclosure, we show the following: When the players' valuations of the prize are the same or not too different, one of the two players discloses information about her contract, and the other player does not. However, when their valuations of the prize are too different, only the player with a lower valuation of the prize discloses information about her contract.

Keywords: contests; delegation; contracts; information disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1628/jite-2024-0033

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