Centralized versus Decentralized Institutions for Expert Testimony

Chulyoung Kim

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2017, vol. 173, issue 2, 209-238

Abstract: The legal community has been debating the question of who should select and provide expert witnesses at trial: the litigant or the judge? Using a persuasion-game framework, I show that there is a trade-off. On one hand, the litigant may consult an expert even when the judge is reluctant to do so due to high costs. On the other hand, given the same amount of expert advice, the judge can make a more accurate decision when using her own expert's advice. I show that the cost of expert advice is an important factor in this trade-off.

JEL-codes: C72 D82 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14664894246848

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