Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment

Juan Pereyra (), Alvaro Forteza and Irene Mussio

No 2303, Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers from Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo.

Abstract: If checks and balances are aimed at protecting citizens from the government’s abuse of power, why do they sometimes weaken them? We address this question in a laboratory experiment in which subjects choose between two decision rules: with and without checks and balances. Voters may prefer an unchecked executive if that enables a reform that, otherwise, is blocked by the legislature. Consistent with our predictions, we find that subjects are more likely to weaken checks and balances when there is political gridlock. However, subjects weaken the controls not only when the reform is beneficial but also when it is harmful.

Keywords: Political agency; separation of powers; checks and balances; lab experiment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E69 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnt:wpaper:2303

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