Coordination games played by children and teenagers: On the influence of age, group size and incentives

Daniela Glätzle-Rützler, Matthias Sutter and Claudia Zoller
Additional contact information
Daniela Glätzle-Rützler: University of Innsbruck
Claudia Zoller: Management Center Innsbruck
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Daniela Glätzle-Rützler

No 2024_18, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: Efficient coordination is a major source of efficiency gains. We study in an experimental coordination game with 718 children and teenagers, aged 9 to 18 years, the strategies played in pre-adulthood. We find no robust age effects in the aggregate, but see that smaller group sizes and larger incentives increase the likelihood of choosing the efficient strategy. Beliefs play an important role as well, as subjects are more likely to play the efficient strategy when they expect others to do so as well. Our results are robust to controlling for individual risk-, time-, and social preferences.

Keywords: coordination game; age; group size; incentives; children; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2024_18online.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Coordination games played by children and teenagers: On the influence of age, group size and incentives (2024)
Working Paper: Coordination Games Played by Children and Teenagers: On the Influence of Age, Group Size and Incentives (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2024_18

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marc Martin ().