Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies

Walter Bossert and Yves Sprumont ()

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sens that there exists a preference profil with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set core elements of the economy for any given initial endowment vector.

Keywords: SOCIAL CHOICE; ECONOMIC MODELS; EXCHANGE ECONOMIES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Core rationalizability in two-agent exchange economies (2002)
Working Paper: Core Rationalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies (2000)
Working Paper: Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:2000-09

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