Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules

Lars Ehlers and B. Klaus
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Berry Klaus and Bettina Klaus ()

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning K indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-envy.

Keywords: PROBABILITY; ECONOMIC MODELS; PREFERENCES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C10 D60 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2001
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Related works:
Journal Article: Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules (2003)
Working Paper: Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:2001-27

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