Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness

Oscar Ferrante, Urszula Gorska-Klimowska, Simon Henin, Rony Hirschhorn, Aya Khalaf, Alex Lepauvre, Ling Liu, David Richter, Yamil Vidal, Niccolò Bonacchi, Tanya Brown, Praveen Sripad, Marcelo Armendariz, Katarina Bendtz, Tara Ghafari, Dorottya Hetenyi, Jay Jeschke, Csaba Kozma, David R. Mazumder, Stephanie Montenegro, Alia Seedat, Abdelrahman Sharafeldin, Shujun Yang, Sylvain Baillet, David J. Chalmers, Radoslaw M. Cichy, Francis Fallon, Theofanis I. Panagiotaropoulos, Hal Blumenfeld, Floris P. Lange, Sasha Devore, Ole Jensen, Gabriel Kreiman, Huan Luo, Melanie Boly, Stanislas Dehaene, Christof Koch, Giulio Tononi, Michael Pitts, Liad Mudrik and Lucia Melloni ()
Additional contact information
Oscar Ferrante: University of Birmingham
Urszula Gorska-Klimowska: University of Wisconsin-Madison
Simon Henin: New York University Grossman School of Medicine
Rony Hirschhorn: Tel Aviv University
Aya Khalaf: Yale School of Medicine
Alex Lepauvre: Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics
Ling Liu: Peking University
David Richter: Radboud University Nijmegen
Yamil Vidal: Radboud University Nijmegen
Niccolò Bonacchi: ISPA - Instituto Universitário
Tanya Brown: Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics
Praveen Sripad: Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics
Marcelo Armendariz: Harvard Medical School
Katarina Bendtz: Harvard Medical School
Tara Ghafari: University of Birmingham
Dorottya Hetenyi: University of Birmingham
Jay Jeschke: New York University Grossman School of Medicine
Csaba Kozma: University of Wisconsin-Madison
David R. Mazumder: Harvard Medical School
Stephanie Montenegro: New York University Grossman School of Medicine
Alia Seedat: New York University Grossman School of Medicine
Abdelrahman Sharafeldin: Georgia Institute of Technology
Shujun Yang: University of Amsterdam
Sylvain Baillet: McGill University
David J. Chalmers: New York University
Radoslaw M. Cichy: Freie Universität Berlin
Francis Fallon: St John’s University
Theofanis I. Panagiotaropoulos: National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Hal Blumenfeld: Yale School of Medicine
Floris P. Lange: Radboud University Nijmegen
Sasha Devore: New York University Grossman School of Medicine
Ole Jensen: University of Oxford
Gabriel Kreiman: Harvard Medical School
Huan Luo: Peking University
Melanie Boly: University of Wisconsin-Madison
Stanislas Dehaene: Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin Center
Christof Koch: Allen Institute
Giulio Tononi: University of Wisconsin-Madison
Michael Pitts: Reed College
Liad Mudrik: Tel Aviv University
Lucia Melloni: New York University Grossman School of Medicine

Nature, 2025, vol. 642, issue 8066, 133-142

Abstract: Abstract Different theories explain how subjective experience arises from brain activity1,2. These theories have independently accrued evidence, but have not been directly compared3. Here we present an open science adversarial collaboration directly juxtaposing integrated information theory (IIT)4,5 and global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT)6–10 via a theory-neutral consortium11–13. The theory proponents and the consortium developed and preregistered the experimental design, divergent predictions, expected outcomes and interpretation thereof12. Human participants (n = 256) viewed suprathreshold stimuli for variable durations while neural activity was measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging, magnetoencephalography and intracranial electroencephalography. We found information about conscious content in visual, ventrotemporal and inferior frontal cortex, with sustained responses in occipital and lateral temporal cortex reflecting stimulus duration, and content-specific synchronization between frontal and early visual areas. These results align with some predictions of IIT and GNWT, while substantially challenging key tenets of both theories. For IIT, a lack of sustained synchronization within the posterior cortex contradicts the claim that network connectivity specifies consciousness. GNWT is challenged by the general lack of ignition at stimulus offset and limited representation of certain conscious dimensions in the prefrontal cortex. These challenges extend to other theories of consciousness that share some of the predictions tested here14–17. Beyond challenging the theories, we present an alternative approach to advance cognitive neuroscience through principled, theory-driven, collaborative research and highlight the need for a quantitative framework for systematic theory testing and building.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1038/s41586-025-08888-1

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