Political Pressure Deflection

James Anderson and Maurizio Zanardi

No 10439, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes --- political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to `sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.

JEL-codes: D72 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Note: ITI
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as James Anderson & Maurizio Zanardi, 2009. "Political pressure deflection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 129-150, October.

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Journal Article: Political pressure deflection (2009)
Working Paper: Political pressure deflection (2009)
Working Paper: Political Pressure Deflection (2004)
Working Paper: Political Pressure Deflection (2004)
Working Paper: Political Pressure Deflection (2004)
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