Monetary Policy and the Currency Denomination of Debt: A Tale of Two Equilibria

Andres Velasco and Roberto Chang

No 10827, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Exchange rate policies depend on portfolio choices, and portfolio choices depend on anticipated exchange rate policies. This opens the door to multiple equilibria in policy regimes. We construct a model in which agents optimally choose to denominate their assets and liabilities either in domestic or in foreign currency. The monetary authority optimally chooses to float or to fix the currency, after portfolios have been chosen. We identify conditions under which both fixing and floating are equilibrium policies: if agents expect fixing and arrange their portfolios accordingly, the monetary authority validates that expectation; the same happens if agents initially expect floating. We also show that a flexible exchange rate Pareto-dominates a fixed one. It follows that social welfare would rise if the monetary authority could precommit to floating.

JEL-codes: E42 F41 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-ifn and nep-mon
Note: IFM
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published as Velasco, Andrés and Roberto Chang. “Monetary Policy and the Currency Denomination of Debt: A Tale of Two Equilibria.” Journal of International Economics 69 (2006): 150-175.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Monetary Policy and the Currency Denomination of Debt: A Tale of Two Equilibria (2004)
Working Paper: Monetary policy and the currency denomination of debt: a tale of two equilibria (2004)
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