Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

Roland Benabou and Jean Tirole

No 11535, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this "overjustification effect" can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the choice by public and private sponsors of incentive levels, their degree of confidentiality and the publicity given to agents' behavior. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.

JEL-codes: D64 D82 H41 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-08
Note: PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

Published as Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1652-1678, December.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Incentives and Prosocial Behavior (2006)
Working Paper: Incentives and Prosocial Behavior (2006)
Working Paper: Incentives and Prosocial Behavior (2006)
Working Paper: Incentives and Prosocial Behavior (2005)
Working Paper: Incentives and Prosocial Behaviour (2004)
Working Paper: Incentives and Prosocial Behavior (2004)
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